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Abstract
The analysis of an eristing reprocessing plant, namely cf the Wiederauf-
arbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe (WAK) shows that the major bulk of informations
releyant to s&feguards is transfered by an extented network system prior
to reception at rather different places of the plant.
Besides oUters, large ef:f'orts to guarantee the correctnesB of the informa-
tions are required.
-------crnena baye been developed ror a plant design at which the generation
and reception of the essential informations are restricted to an uniform
area and for which a reduction of the safeguards costs ean be expected.
The principaJ. arrangement of such aplant is given.
Die Analyse einer bestehenden Wiederaufa.rbeitungsanlage, nämlich der
Wiederaufarbeit ungsanlage Karlsruhe (WAK) zeigt, daß ein Großteil der für
die Spaltstoffflußkontrolle wichtigen Informationen über ein ausgedehntes
Inf'ormatioiisnetzwerk läuft, bevor sie an verschiedenen, über die Anlage ver-
teilten Stellen entgegengenommen werden können.
Hieraus ergibt sich u.a. ein erheblieher Auf'wand für die Sicherstellung der
Richtigkeit der Informationen.
Es werden Kriterien für einen Anlagenentwurf entwickelt., bei dem die Erzeugung
und Entgegennahme der wesentlichen Informationen auf einen einheitlichen Be-
reich beschränkt und damit ein geringer Kontrollautwand zu erwarten ist. Eine
solche Anlage wird in ihren Grundzügen skizziert.
--------------------~--------------------~---------~--------
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I. Introduction
One of the important objectives of the systems analytical investigations and
containment studies carried out at Karlsruhe, has been to develop design
criteria for the layoutof principal nuclear facilities, which would facilitate
the application of safeguards in an optimum manner L-I_7. A number of integral
exercises ~2,4,5_7 and analyses of layouts of some existing fabrication {-6_7
and reprocessing plants ~7_7 have shown that,a modern safeguards system based
on material balance accountancy supplemented by containment and some surveillance
measures can be applied to these plants with certain restrictions. However, the
intensity and the extent of safeguards efforts would be reduced significantly
if some changes were introduced to the plant layouts.
In the present paper, the causes which normally lead to increased safeguards
efforts and intensities in an existing reprocessing facility, have been analysed
for a WAK (Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage für Kernbrennstoffe, Karlsruhe) type. Some
basic design criteria for 1aying out a reprocessing plant, which would meet the
requirements of a modern safeguards system and could lead to reduced safeguards
efforts and intensities, have also been discussed and a corresponding layout
proposed.
2. Causes for increased efforts in a existing plant
2.1 Information network
The safeguards activities in a nuclear facility are carried out mainly to generate
or to test information in connection with the Iocation and movement of fissile
materials. In a reprocessing plant, a major part of this information is necessary
for the establishment or checking of a material balance around the plant, although
supplementary information on some containment and surveillance measures are also
required. One of the causes for additional safeguards efforts in an existing plant
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is the manner in which the network for such an information system is laid out.
This is shown in a schematic manner in Fig. I. The points of generation,
registration, processing and reception of information in a WAK type plant
are indicated in this figure. Fig. 2 gives the same information for the dis-
solver tank area of this plant.
It is seen from these figures that:
a) The information relevant to safeguards (e.g fissile material amounts for the
feed, product and waste streams) are generated almost throughout the plant.
b) Part of the information is received at the point of its generation (product
stream) but a major part is registered at the control panel of the plant
(e.g. level indication for feed and waste streams).
c) All information on fissile material concentration is generated in or near
the relevant process steps (e.g. input accountability, product, waste tanks
and sampling from the relevant tanks), processed at the laboratory and some-
times received at some other point (e.g. inspection room).
d) The different accountability tanks, sampling stations, control panel, the
analytical laboratory and the inspection room are located at different floors
of the process building and are physically widely apart.
In short, it appears that in an existing reprocessing plant the various process
steps are arranged in a centralized manner,whereas, the information system is
decentralized. Particularly this point leads to a complicated,wide spread informa-
tion network system. 'This requires large efforts in ensuring the credibility of
the information and receiving them for safeguards purposes.
2.2 Containment problems
It appears difficult to execute adequate containment and surveil1ance measures
particularly during the transition steps between the fuel storage and the accounta-
bility measurements in an existing plant. It may be noted that:
a) The fuel elements lose their identity at the dissolver tank.
b) The recycle acid from different process tanks containing various amounts
of Uranium and Plutonium (although very small percentage of the feed flow
under normal conditions) is fed back at this point.
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c) That the leached hulls may leave this point without sufficient measurements
with regard to their fissile material content. And finally,
d) Dissolver solution may be introduced to the process area without having
the possibility of measuring it at the accountability tank.
Because of these conditions, the necesssity of having good containment and
surveillant measures is accentuated at this point.
2.3 Inventory taking
For establishing the material balance around the process area, the fissile material
-----UWentoryTn----ulatareanas to l>eKnoWIlDyairect measurement. In exas t rng plants
this inventory can normally be made with some degree of accuracy after a washout.
This is expensive and can be carried out only by discontinuing the normal operation.
It appears that the method for process inventory determination during a campaign,
which is being developed at Karlsruhe L-3,4,S_7, can be used successfully in
existing plants also.
'
However, it may require sample takings at points where
they are not foreseen for normal operating purposes.
A part cf the safeguards efforts is influenced significantly by the ease with
which the process inventory in a plant can be determined.
2.4 Measurement of process flows
In many of the existing plants, analytical facilities are often just sufficient
to meet the plant requirement and additional capacity for safeguards measurements
are normally not available. This necessitates transport of samples to other
laboratories, causing significant and undesirable delays in establishing a material
balance. Besides, long storage time of active sampies may give riseto effects
which may destort the material balance results.
2.5 Safeguarding waste streams
In existing plants, a number of waste streams with different levels of activity
and with traces of fissile material is produced. The arrangement of collectiori
and measurement of these streams are generally such that a fairly large effort
is required to safeguard these streams effectively, although their fissile material
content is low.
-4-
3. Procedural requirements of a modern safeguards system
For the proper execution of safeguards activities, a number of safeguards
procedures are required which consist of actions both by the safeguards
organizeation and the plant operators. The effectiveness with which these
procedures can be carried out in practice, depends partlyon the design
and the layout of a plant. These procedures are summarized below.
3.1 Examination of design review
Some overall information on the design and layout of the plant is to be sub-
mitted to the safeguards organization. This should enable the organization
____tD_:_
a) Define material safeguards areas and select those strategie points
which will be used to determine the input and output of nuclear
material in these areas for accounting purposes of the safeguards organisation;
b) Establish procedures and convenient frequencies and timing for
taking a physical inventory;
c) Establish the recording and reporting requirements and records
evaluation procedures;
d) Select appropriate containment and surveillance methods and
techniques on the basis of the existing or planned plant layout; and
e) Establish inspection requirements and procedures for verification of
the quantities and composition of nuclear material and select the strategie
points where inspections shall normally be made,
3.2 Reports and records system
Aperiodie r eccrd Ing systemindieating the stratus of t.he fissile material
in a plant forms an essential part of the safeguards procedures. Such a system
enables the safeguards organization to follow the fissile material flow and
inventory pattern in the whole fuel cycle and establish consistancy correlations
between the fissile material flows through the different parts of the cycle.
Such areport system is to be based on plant records on fissile material flows
and inventories and the relevant parts of such records should be available to
inspectorate personnel for comparing the records with the reports. The report-
ing system may also enable the safeguards organization to minimize on-site
inspections.
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Reports and records systems can be prepared and utilized in an optimum way
if the information system on material balance is laid out in a transparent
manner.
3.3 Inspections
Some of the more important funcHons of inspections are:
a) The verification in connection with the design information that the
facility will permit the effective application of safeguards;
b) The verification that reports are consistent with records;
c) The verification of recorded inventory and flow by independent
----------
_._-_.-
measurements of nuclear material or other independent and objective
methods;
d) Application of containment and surveillance methods;
e) The verification of reports on abnormal losses of nuclear material or
the investigation of an incident that has given rise to a special
report.
The effectiveness and the extent of intrusiveness of such inspections may depend
to a large extent on the plant design.
4. Design criteria facilitating safeguards
In view of the ~onsiderationsmade under chapters 2 and 3, it is possible to
formulate a number of requirements for the layouts and pesign of a reprocessing
plant which would facilitate safeguards procedures.
4.1 The points for the registration and processing of information relevant
to safeguards should be concentrated in space and should be reduced to the
minimum possible number.
4.2 The information distribution network relevant to safeguards, should be
transparent so that effective measures for ensuring correctness of information
can be applied easily and an uncomplicated recording and reporting system can be
maintained.
4.3 Wherever possible and economically justifiable, the information system should
be automated and mechanized.
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4.4 Adequate containment and surveillance possibilities should exist to
ensure continuity of knowledge at the head end of the plant. Containment for
the rest of the plant should ensure a timely detection of an introduction of
undeclared fuel or of any other illegal action associated with a diversion.
4.5 The relevant process steps should be arranged in a transparent manner so
that both the throughput and the physical inventory can be measured easily,
accurately and quickly without undue interference with the normal operation of
the plant. In case the physical inventory of apart of the plant can be a
ascertained only with the help of a washout, this. part should be laid out in
such a manner that a complete washout can be undertaken within a short time
_ ._n_and-J:haLb_o-t.h-the~esidue i n tbe-plant-and-the.-w-ashed-o.l1t-So 111ti on can.ibe..
measured easily and with sufficient accuracy with respect to their fissile
material content.
4.6 It should be possible to safeguard all the waste streams as an integrated
whole.
4.7 Sufficient additional space and facility should be available in the plant
for t he execu t Lon of safeguards measures, forexample. anal.ys i.s of additional
sampies for independent verification, verification of records and report
systemetc.
4.8 The layout of those parts of the plant which may be industrially sensitive,
should be such that the fissile material inventories are relatively smail in
those parts and that the probability of a diversion of any significant amount
of fissile material from these parts, without a timely detection, would be low.
4.9 Finally, the plant layout and the process design should be such that safe-
guards measures can be executed in the most cost-effective and nonintrusive
manner, without hampering unduely the normal operation of the plant.
5. Principle arrangement of a reference reprocessing plant
A schematic and modified layout of the WAK type plant, which could meet the
safeguards requirements enumerated under chapter 4, is shown in Fig. 3. The main
characteristics of this plant is the decentralization of the different process
buHdings and a centrally located information building. The possibility of a
decentralization in a reprocessing plant was considered at a fairly early stage
by the WAK plant management /-8 7 and the present layout leans partlyon the
earlier concept.
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The main proeess buildings namely, fuel storage (2), head end (3), proeess (4)
and produet and waste storage (5/6) are all arranged around the eentral informa-
tion building (1) so that fissile material flows from or to any of the main
proeess buildings have to pass through the different strategie points loeated
in the information building. When required the fissile material inventories
from the proeess building ean also be brought to storage tanks located at the
strategie areas.
5.1 Information bui1ding
Under normal eonditions, all the safeguards measures ean be exeeuted by the
inspectorate personne1 at the various stratetic areas 10eated in this bui1ding.
-- ---- -- _ .._------
The bui1ding is divided into two f1oors. The ground f100r is partitioned into a
number of strategie points a)to i)at whieh all the streams relevant to fissile
material balance aeeountancy, are identified, measured or stored. The upper f100r
is divided broad1y into two areas IA and IB. In IA instrument panels, analytica1
facilities -and reeords and reports offices are provided for safeguards and plant
aeeountabi1ity purposes. Area IB eontains contro1 panels and ana1ytica1 faci1ities
required main1y for plant operation or proeess eontro1 purposes.
Normally, all the fissile material enters the plant through the entranee of the
information building near the fue1 storage. The same entranee is used for the
removal of the 1eached hul1s as solid waste. The other entranee at the opposite
end is meant for the supp1y of non-nue1ear materials and shipment of final products
and liquid wastes or their residues. This is also used as the main entranee for
the plant personnel. The plant personnel can enter the proeess buildings on1y
through eorridor entranees from the information building.
6. Safeguards aetivities
The safeguards aetivities proposed for this plant are based on proeedures dis-
eussed in chapter 3.
6.1 Fuel storage bui1dihg
A double storied strategie point a)has been envisaged at the entranee of the
information bui1ding near the fuel storage. The transport cask for irradiated
fuels is supposed to be unloaded here. The eounting, identifieation and intactness-
tests for the irradiated fuel elements and similar measures for the cask, ean be
earried out during the un10ading period. With suitable systems, all these measures
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can be executed from the panel room lA. The identified fue1 elements are stored
in the wet storage bui1ding 2 in which the same counting and identification
systems can be used when required. This bui1ding is supposed to be comp1ete1y
aecessible to safeguards personne1 for physica1 verification and therefore.can
be regarded as a strategie area for safeguards.
The identified fuel elements ean enter the head~end bui1ding on1y through the
strategie point b)in the information bui1ding. At this point, the elements enter-
ing the head-end bui1ding will be identified once more and debited from the fuel
storage inventory. As at a) all the safeguards measures can be carried out from
lA.
6.2 Head-end bui1ding
The chop-leaeh units and the dissolver tanks are located in this building. The
fissile material inputs to this building are the fue1 elements and the recye1e
aeid from the proee~building. The output streams consist of the leaehed hu1ls
in the form of solid waste and the process solution whieh ean enter the process
building only through the aceountabili~tank c)&Adequate containment and surveill-
anee systems (in the form öf liquid indicating senso~,elöse eireuit televisions
etc.) are supposed to be incorporated in this bui1ding to ensure that all the
fissile material eontaining streams leading or entering the building,ean do so
only through the strategie points i).b).c)and f).A bypassing of these points is
assumed to be indieated with a high probability.
The fissile material content of the 1eaehed hulls, whieh are diseharged from the
dissolver tank and stored in barrels, is measured with a nondestruetive method
at the strategie point i).The barrels are all sea1ed and temporari1y stored at
this point. At regular intervals, they are removed from the plant on special
railway earriages after eounting and identifieation.
6.3 Aecountabi1ity eell
As a strategie point, the aecountabi1ity eell le in the information bui1ding
oceupies a unique position in the safeguards system proposed for this plant.
In this eell suffieient number of ealibrated tanks are installed. In these tanks
fissile material eontent of various active proeess solutions, from or to the
proeess building, whieh are important from safeguards point of view can be
determined with sufficient aeeuraey. Such solutions may be the input stream for
the extraetion eyeles in the proeess building, reeyele acid to the dissolver,
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rework solutions containing Uranium and Plutonium. washout solutions
from process inventory t aki.ng , liquid waste solutions from the process areas
and so on. Since all the relevant safeguards information on the fissile material
amounts is generated in this cell. and registered. processed or received in the
safeguards panel room lA. the reliability of this information can be ensured
relatively easily. Also the reception of all the information 1S possible in a
single room. The tanks in the accountability cell can be calibrated from time
to time by the inspectorate personnei.
In case of the dissolver solution. it is filled up in the accountability tank c)
located in the accountability cello The volume (or weight) of the solution
- -i-s-i-nd-icated---at- -the- t>ane1-in-lA-and--t-he---cSQ1-u-t-ion-samp~~-ar-e-t--ak-et\---a\l-t--oma-t--ie-a-l-l-~v-'-­
and assayed for their fissile material content in the analytical rooms of lAI
The results of these measurements are available both to the inspectors and the
operators personnei. The same procedure is used for the recycle acid going from
the process to the head-end building (point f of Fig. 3).
6.4 Process building
All the process steps for the purification and separation of Uranium and
Plutonium as weIl as the acid and solvent recovery systems are located in this
building. Besides. the building has sufficient space for storage of inactive
materials and other auxiliary facilities. The fissile material input is the
dissolver solution measured in the accountability tank cJ.The outp~ consist
of the purified Uranium and Plutonium products, different types of liquid waste
strearns (organic and aqueous with different grades of activities) and the re-
covered ac Ld ,
Apart of the recovered acid is sent to the dissolver tank through the accounta-
bility cello Different types of liquid waste solutions produced in the process
building are sent to intermediate storage tanks (calibrated) located in this
cell and after assaying the fissile material amount. transfered to the main
waste storage and treatment areas in building 5/6. The safeguards measures
for these streams at the accountability cell are the same as those for the
dissolver solution.
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The purified Plutonium and Uranium products are filled in the respective
product containers and are weighted and sampled at the strategie point d)~
They are also sealed and registered at this point. The samples are analysed
in IA. The sealed containers are sent to the product storage areas in building
5/6.
Adequate containment and surveillance measures are provided for the process
building to ensure that no uncontrolled material containing significant amounts
of Uranium or Plutonium (e.g. Plutonium containing waste or scraps from a
Plutonium fabrication plant),can be introduced to and after purification remove~
from this building. The emergency exits of this building remain sealed under
___ ----UonnaLconditions~ _
6.5 Product and waste storage building
This building is devided in two broad areas, one for the storage of Uranium
and Plutonium products and the other, for the storage and treatment of liquid
wastes. It is assumed, that different types of waste solutions received in this
area,will not be stored there indefinitely. Depending on the type, activity etc.,
they tJin either be treated further in this area aud shipped periodically for
permanent storage elsewhere, or removed from the plant at regular intervals for
treatment or storage at some other place. The inputs to this building are the
sealed product containers with predetermined amounts of Plutonium and Uranium
and known amounts of liquid waste solutions. Outputs are the same sealed con-
tainers and discrete amounts of treated or untreated wastes in solid or liquid
form.
The seals of the product containers are checked at the strategic point e)before
they are sent away from the plant. The amounts of fissile material removed in
this way are debited fram the inventory of the product storage area.
The strategic point h)is used to register the liquid waste amounts leaving
the plant. Depending on their forms, the fissile material content in these
amounts may be measured either with direct or with nondestructive methods.
These amounts will also be debited from the inventory of the waste storage area.
The waste and the product storage areas are completely accessible to safeguards
personnel for physical verification and therefor~ can be regarded as a strategic
area for safeguards purposes.
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6.6 Inventory taking
It is necessary to determine the physical inventory of fissile material in
all the process and storage buildings at a given time, to establish a material
balance around the plant over a given period of time. It is expected that the
inventory taking will be considerably simplified because of the decentralized
layout of the plant. Another advantage of decentralisation is that the physical
inventory for each process building (which is necessarily smaller than the
inventory of the whole plant) can be determined seperately.
The inventory of the fuel storage and the product storage buildin~ can be de-
termined completely at any time by counting and identifying the fuel elements
--_._ .._-_ .._-_._-~--_ .._~_-----_._-
and the sealed product containers respectively. In the case of fuel elements,
the counting and identification system used during the unloading of the transport
cask, can also be used in the wet storage area.
With the use of correlation techniques L-9_7, the fissile material content in
each fuel element after its discharge from a known type of reactor, can be pre-
dicted with fairly high accuracy. Therefore, knowing the number of fuel elements
which has entered the head-end building; the fissile material lnventory in this
building can also oe predicted with some acceptable aceuraey. This inventory can
then be verified by dissolving these fuel elements and measuring the fissile
material eontent of the dissolver solution in the accountability tank e)and in
the leached hulls at the strategie point i).
The fissile material inventory of the proeess building at a given time, can be
determined with the help of the isotopic analysis technique 13,4,l7or by wash-
ing out the plant at the end of a eampaign. In both these cases, the required
safeguards measures ean be carried out at the strategie areas in the information
building and in the fuel storage area.
The fissile material inventory in the liquid waste area is expected to be low.
In a WAK type plant, the input of Plutonium to this area will not exceed 2-5 kg!yr.
Sinee it is assumed that the waste solutions will be removed periodically from
this area, the Plutonium inventory is not expeeted to exeeed 2-5 kg of Plutonium.
Although the probability of diversion at this point is the lowest because of
high dilution and high activity (which may be regarded as a self-sealing safe-
guards measure), provision is made to carry out a rough physical inventory for
safeguards purposes once a year. This can be done by measuring the levels of
the storage tanks in this area and taking individual sampies.
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Fissile material containing sampies taken to the analytical room lA and lB
are assumed to be colleeted at these areas. Every six months the fissile
material eontent of the eolleeted and integrated samples will be measured
and removed to one of the proeess streams after balancing the amounts if
they exeeed apreset signifieant value.
7. ImpJrovements
The present layout has been eoneeived on the existing teehnology in a WAK type
plant. A further reduetion in the spaee and in safeguards efforts may be aehieved
if eertain teehnologieal improvements ar~ as~umed to oe incorporated in the
plswnt.. '!'wo such e:lCWiIpleli 111~ oe cited..
a) On-line instrumentation at the aeeountability tank: If an on-line instrument
for determining the fissile material eoneentration in dissolver solution
eould be attaehed to the aeeountability tank e)and loeated in the eell
indieated after strategie point b).and sampies eould be fed automatieally
to this instrument, the results eould be registered in the instrument panel
located in JA. In that ease all additional analytical facilities for de-
termining the fissile material content at this point could be eliminated
from the analytical room lA.
b) Continuous flow measurement of waste streams: Most of the ealibrated waste
casked tanks in the accountability cell could be eliminated if liquid waste
flows from the proeess to the waste storage building 5/6 eould be eontinuous-
ly assayed with flow and coneentration measuring instruments.
8. Conelusions
A modified plant layout for the WAK type plant, whieh eould permit the exeeution
of various measures of a modern safeguards system in an effeetive manner, has
been discussed in this paper. The main features of the layout is a deeentralisa-
tion of the proeess building. They are arranged around a eentral information
building in sueh a manner that all the relevant information ean be obtained at
the different strategie points loeated at this building. This requires that any
fissile material streams leading or entering a process building have to pass
through one of the strategie points. Also all personnel and material entering
any of the proeess buildings have to go through the information building.
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Although the layout has been kept fairly flexible and requires a detailed
feasibility analysis before one could draw firm conclusions, it permits one
to recognize some advantages for the application of safeguards measures.
8.1 Through decentralisation of process bui1dings there is a clear and physical
separation between the inventory intensive areas (fue1 and product storage)
and the process areas. The inventory intensive areas can be made completely
accessible for safeguards purposes. The process areas,namely, the head-end
and the process building are expected to have low fissile material inventory
compared to the storage areas. This low inventory, coupled with the fact that
relatively simple containment and surveillance devices can be used to indi~
-- ------cate----any-uncontro-l--l-elf-emovemen~___ur_tr_n-i:_l-e____ma1:l!_ri__a._t,'(J()u1<1 mean-tha t the prooa-
bi1ity of an undetected diversion from these buildings wou1d be very low.
8.2 All the safeguards relevant information are generated, registered, processed
and received at the information building. This concentration of information is
expected to minimize efforts both in the execution of safeguards measures and
in ensuring the reliability of the generated information.
8.3 There is a clear and physical separation between the proeess steps and the
measurement and control steps. This appears to be advantageous to both the plant
operators and the safeguards personnei. It is highly desirable to locate the
delicate and often sensitive control and measuring instruments away from the
process building in which all the heavy process machineries are normally locat-
ed. Also intrusiveness and hindrance to normal operation of the plant through
safeguards activities can be reduced to a minimum by keeping these activities
restricted to a completely separate building under normal conditions. On the
other hand, the safeguards personnel are mainly interested in the information
generated in the different process steps and not in the process steps themselves.
Therefore, aseparation of such information campletely from the process steps,
and its accessibility in a single building, wou1d enab1e the safeguards per-
sonnel to concentrate on1y on those measures which are pertinent to safeguards.
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INDICES:
o GENERATION OF INFORMATION
RECEPTION OF INFOffi.1ATION ON TUE
AMOUNT OF MATERIALS
2 PROCESSING AND RECEPTION OF
INFORMATION ON TUE FISSILE ~~TERIAL
CONCENTRATIONS
FIG. 1: INFORMATION NETWORK IMPORTANT TO SAFEGUARDS IN AN EXISTING REPROCESSING
PLANT OF THE WAK-TYPE
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CONTBOL PANEL)
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C2 = PROCESSING AND RECEPTION OF INFORMATION ON THE FISSILE
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FIG. 2: TYFICAL EXAl~LE FOR GENERATION PROCESSING AND RECEPTION OF MATERIAL
BALANCE INFORMATION FOR THE DISSOLVER TANK OF A WAK-TYFE PLANT
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INFORMATION BUILDING WITH
STRATEGIe POINTS
11>. PANEL Jl.ND A-i'l'AT.YTICAL ROOM
FOR SAFEGUARDS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
1B PJUlEL AND ANALYTICAL ROOM
FOR OPERATION
1C ACCOUNTABILITY CELL
2 FUEL STORAGE
3 HEAD END
4 PROCESS
5/6 PRODUCT AND WASTE STORAGE
ACTI~ITIES AT STRATEGIC POINTS
a REGISTRATION, IDENTIFICATION AND INTACTNESS TEST
OF FUEL ELEMENTS ARRIVING
b REGISTRATION, IDENTIFICATION AND INTACTNESS TEST
OF FUEL ELEMENTS LEAVING THE STORAGE
c INPUT MEASUREMENT OF DISSOLVER SOLUTION
d REGISTRATION , SAMPLIIlG, SE.ll.LING .ll.ND INSPECTION OF
PRODUCT CONTAINERS TO BE STORED
e REGISTRATION , IDENTIFICATION AND INSPEGTION OF
PRODUCT CONTAINERS TO BE SHIPPED
f RECYCLED ACID MEASUREMENT
g MEASUREMENT OF LIQUID WASTE TO BE SENT TO
STORAGE
h MEASUREMENT OF LIQUID WASTE TO BE SHIPPED
i REGISTRATION , MEASUREMENT, SEALING AND INSPECTION OF
SOLIDWASTE TO BE STORED OR SHIPPED
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FIG. 3: PRINCIPLE ARRANGEMENT OF A MODIFIED WAK TYPE PLANT
(indices see Fig. 1)
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